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Abstract. Human-level artificial intelligence (HAI) surely is a special research
endeavor in more than one way: In the first place, the very nature of intelligence
is not entirely clear; there are no criteria commonly agreed upon necessary or
sufficient for the ascription of intelligence other than similarity to human perfor-
mance (and even this criterion is open for a plethora of possible interpretations);
there is a lack of clarity concerning how to properly investigate HAI and how to
proceed after the very first steps of implementing an HAI system; etc. In this note
I assess the ways in which the approach of Psychometric Artificial Intelligence
[1] can (and cannot) be taken as a foundation for a scientific approach to HAI.
1 Introduction
From a certain perspective AI seems to stand out between the modern sciences for more
than one reason: Neither is there agreement upon what shall be AI’s overall objective
(i.e., whether the purpose of AI is the implementation of technical systems support-
ing humans in their everyday tasks and facilitating human intellectual activity, or if the
purpose of AI is the creation of a computer system exhibiting general intelligence —
in doing so possibly outperforming humans in tasks requiring reasoning and thought
—, or something in between these two extremes), nor is there a commonly accepted
methodology for conducting research in AI, nor is there consensus concerning the val-
uation of previous developments and of the actual status quo in AI as a story of success
or perpetual failure.
These and related observations repeatedly caused philosophers of science and even
some researchers from within AI to wonder about AI being a special type of science,
or to even question (and occasionally finally deny) the status of AI as a science. In
this note, specifically focussing on the subbranch of AI dealing with human-level AI
(HAI), I want to undertake a critical review of Psychometric AI (PAI) [1] which has
been proposed as a strictly scientific approach and conceptual framework suitable for
measuring, evaluating, and guiding progress during the development of an HAI system.
2 Introducing Psychometric AI
Psychometric AI [1] aims to apply the full battery of techniques from psychometrics to
an HAI context, setting its internal standard by declaring an agent as intelligent if and
only if it does well in all established, validated tests of intelligence.1 PAI as a dedicated
1 This definition of PAI actually only is approximate and partially incomplete. For the actual
detailed phrasing see the following section introducing and discussing PAI in detail.
research program was first explicitly institutionalized a decade ago in [1] and has been
actively worked on since (as, e.g., documented by the articles collected in [2]).
2.1 Psychometrics and Intelligence
Psychometrics as a field is by definition concerned with analyzing and developing
means of psychological measurement as, for instance, personality assessments or ques-
tionnaires for measuring certain abilities or knowledge. For doing so, psychometrics
engages in the study of theoretical approaches to measurement as well as in the ac-
tive development and implementation of the corresponding concrete instruments and
procedures. For a long time special interest has been taken in the measurement of the
phenomena commonly subsumed under the term “intelligence”: There is a wide va-
riety of psychometric tests of intelligence, ranging from tests with only one type of
item to varied batteries of different questions, combining verbal and non-verbal items
and requiring subjects to perform qualitatively very different tasks (e.g., spatial tasks as
opposed to language-related tasks).
2.2 Psychometrics and Artificial Intelligence
The goal of PAI now is to carry over the quantitative assessment of intelligence from
the realm of classical psychometrics into artificial intelligence. In his programmatic
papers [1, 3, 4], Bringsjord introduces PAI as a research program and discusses various
objections critics might have.
Naive Psychometric AI: The first attempt at defining what it means for an agent (hu-
man or artificial) to be intelligent, given in [1] and repeated in the later publications,
reads as follows: “Some agent is intelligent if and only if it excels at all established,
validated tests of intelligence.”
So in this account, which I will refer to as “naive PAI” (nPAI) in the following,
AI in its entirety is reduced to a strictly psychometric core, namely the construction of
a system which outperforms most humans in all currently available intelligence tests.
Clearly, as also noticed by Bringsjord, this definition is overly narrow and insufficient
for the purpose of building an HAI. Even the most advanced and broad battery of items
has to be considered as too narrow when compared to the full range of cognitive ca-
pacities seen in humans. And also from a system engineer’s perspective, given that at
any point in time there will only be a finite number of commonly accepted tests of in-
telligence available, the maxim underlying nPAI seems dubious: Each of the individual
capacities could be addressed by a specifically dedicated standalone subsystem, so that
intelligence would actually be reduced to correctly selecting and executing the respec-
tive module from a finite number of available subprograms based on a finite number of
possible input categories. But this could hardly be considered satisfactory as an answer
to the intelligence puzzle for anyone but diehard followers of Descartes: At least the
Cartesian would be comforted in that the resulting AI — being an almost ideal instan-
tiation of a “type-c machine” [5] — might be able to pass any test for a particular set of
cognitive capacities, whilst still failing a test for any mental power whatsoever.
General Psychometric AI: A second, more commonly used definition of PAI, to which
I will henceforth refer as “general PAI” (gPAI), is also introduced in [1]: “Psychometric
AI is the field devoted to building information-processing entities capable of at least
solid performance on all established, validated tests of intelligence and mental ability,
a class of tests that includes not just the rather restrictive IQ tests, but also tests of
artistic and literary creativity, mechanical ability, and so on.”
Clearly, gPAI intuitively feels a lot like the classical Turing Test [6]. And this im-
pression is not unfounded: Having a look at Harnad’s Total Turing Test (TTT; [7]) as
modernized and (possibly) broadened version of Turing’s original proposal, we notice
that — due to the simple mass of possible test methods, presentation modalities and
required modes of interaction — a solution to gPAI would most likely also serve as an
important step towards solid performance on the TTT. Conversely, a system convinc-
ingly solving the TTT most likely would also encompass the ability to solve gPAI.
So instead of focusing exclusively on the classical psychometric battery of tests
for intelligence, gPAI widens its focus to also encompass all other available tests for
cognitive capacities whatsoever. As there are now at least two possible reading to this
claim. In order to avoid misunderstandings, let us clarify what in all probability is the
intended meaning of this statement: Although the definition could be read as universally
quantified statement in a strong sense, demanding from a system trying to accomplish
gPAI to solve all possible tests for all conceivable mental capacities which might be
validated at some point, this does not seem meaningful as a standard for evaluation.2 In
light of these considerations what is meant by the description of gPAI quoted above is
the requirement for an AI system to pass, at a given point in time, all available validated
psychometric tests for any kind of mental ability. So although the number of possible
tests would still be enormous, gPAI would in this reading (contrary to the first possible
interpretation) nonetheless be dealing with a finite and well-defined set of tests; the
significant difference to nPAI resulting from opening up the scope of the tests from a
strict focus on tests of intelligence to also include other mental abilities in general.
3 (Dis)Advantages of Psychometric AI for Guiding HAI
Let us return to the initial considerations concerning the use of PAI as means of guid-
ance and assessment for the development of human-level artificial intelligence.
3.1 The Beauty of Numbers: What PAI Can Do
The great advantage of an approach such as PAI over, for instance, the (Total) Turing
Test is the quantitative nature of the used evaluation method. Psychometric methods and
tests are metric by their very nature, they are designed to provide assessments in terms
of numbers on a scale. This clearly has already two advantages by itself: On the one
hand, if psychometrics is applied in the evaluation of an artificial agent the result is a
number which is at first glance directly comparable to the results of other systems on the
same test(s). There is no question of how to compare outcomes of different evaluation
2 Especially not since gPAI claims superiority over the Turing Test/Total Turing Test amongst
others also for being — from an engineering perspective — in its goals and conditions of
success less elusive and for almost automatically enforcing a more feasible and manageable
approach by gPAI’s test-based nature (see [1] for details).
runs, the standardized nature of the testing technique is meant to take care of these and
similar issues. On the other hand, this also allows for a fairly unquestionable measure
of progress, both due to the applied evaluation method as well as due to the overall
goal of the PAI approach. A higher score on a particular battery of tests simply and
straightforwardly indicates that the examined agent has advanced towards the target
of performing decently on the respective tests. And, in turn, the term “decently” is
(at least for HAI) also clearly defined by, for example, the average outcome human
test subjects achieve on the tests under consideration; so even problems surrounding
optimality criteria and/or the choice of an appropriate normative dimension seem to be
addressable by the framework.
These advantages should by no means be underappreciated. Research in HAI has
in many ways suffered from a lack of quantitative assessment methods for its systems:
Neither could researchers easily compare the performance of their different agents and
AIs, nor could they themselves know whether and how well they were advancing in the
outcomes of their work. In summary, PAI does offer several very pleasant properties
which many other paradigms lack and, I believe, can with a clear conscience be rec-
ommended for consideration as a solution to everyone whose main concern lies with
having a research program with completely transparent and hard-to-question means of
evaluation. Still, as will be discussed in the following subsection, this comes at a price
which casts serious doubt on the applicability of PAI in HAI, and even the satisfiability
of PAI’s own goals by means of PAI.
3.2 A (Possibly) Fatal Flaw: What PAI Cannot Do
HAI has been characterized as the endeavor to create computer systems that exhibit
intelligence at a level similar to humans. This by itself is ambiguous in many ways as
neither “exhibit” nor “intelligence” are well-defined in the given context. Against this
background, PAI3 now offers clear specifications for both terms, equating a system’s
exhibition of intelligence with its performance on a huge variety of psychometric tests
for different mental capacities — the act of solving the tests becomes the active demon-
stration, the resulting scores define the (level of) intelligence. But it is here where a
quite troublesome conceptual flaw in the PAI framework comes to light.
[1] justifies the reliance on psychometrics as crucially defining criterion of an agent’s
intelligence as follows: “What’s intelligence? (...) [M]ost thinkers seem to forget that
there is a particularly clear and straightforward answer available, courtesy of the field
that has sought to operationalize the concept in question; that field is psychometrics.
Psychometrics is devoted to systematically measuring psychological properties, usu-
ally via tests. These properties include the one most important in the present context:
intelligence.”
But this reading of psychometrics and the relation between its tests and the respec-
tive objects of investigation unfortunately turns out to be overly simplistic. Psychome-
tric tests do not directly measure any mental ability as, for example, intelligence or
3 As already discussed above, nPAI (when seen in an HAI context) clearly seems to be overly
simplistic in many ways. As, moreover, it is trivially subsumed under the notion of gPAI I will
in the following argument without loss of generality only refer to the latter notion.
creativity. There even is no unanimously agreed upon definition of what exactly intelli-
gence is as a mental faculty and what its defining characteristics would be; and the same
holds for many other high-level cognitive capacities. Psychometric measures are corre-
lational measures, measuring the performance of traits which are commonly associated
(and assumed to be strongly positively correlated) with what is considered intelligence
— and even these correlations are in part justified merely by plausibility arguments and
general agreement within the respective research community.
Therefore, what PAI actually trains its systems on (and measures them against) is
not a standard for human-like intelligence of what form soever, but are benchmarks
for better defined, more or less clearcut cognitive capacities which are quite plausibly
intimately related and/or part of what is considered human intelligence. But even when
taking the entirety of available psychometric tests available at a specific point in time (as
proposed by gPAI) and having a system succeed on them, we still would only be dealing
with placeholders and parts without any guarantee at all that an immediate measure
of “human intelligence” would implicitly or explicitly have emerged from within the
collection of different tests (leaving . In a way similar to the case of a person suffering
from the savant syndrome [8], when an AI should exceed human performance on all
available psychometric means of assessment of intelligence or other high-level mental
abilities, all we would know for sure is that the system performs better on the tested
correlated tasks — but nothing would be revealed about whether the system is “truly
intelligent” in the general way typically developing humans are deemed to be.
Clearly, a strict behaviorist would disagree with this conclusion as at least from
the exclusively behavior-oriented point of view human and machine would be indis-
tinguishable in their performance on the applied psychometric tests. But at the same
time, even from this perspective, it could not be excluded that there might still be the
possibility of some aspect of intelligence that simply had not yet been accounted for in
the available battery of measures — so even under a behaviorist angle the verdict that
solving PAI guarantees that human-level intelligence has been achieved by an artificial
intelligence would require a considerable leap of faith.
4 Comparison to Related Work and Conclusion
Trying to establish an adequate standard for ascertaining the level of human-like intelli-
gence an artificial agent has achieved goes back to the very beginning of AI research —
one might even say that the field started out from this question in [6]. Thus it should not
come by surprise that by now there is a remarkable variety of tests on the market, two
of them being the above mentioned original Turing Test and Harnad’s expansion of it,
the Total Turing Test. As already discussed, Total Turing Test and gPAI seem to share
a close relationship in terms of their generality and requirements. Unfortunately, this
closeness also makes them share a weakness usually brought forth against the Turing
Test (and thus even more applicable to the more general TTT): Amongst others, [9, 10]
remark that the Turing Test might be effectively useless as a test of machine intelligence
as for passing it something similar to a “human subcognitive substrate” [9] would be
needed. For a task like the Turing Test this seems fairly straightforward, as the machine
would have to make sure that it can reflect all the behaviors produced by low- and mid-
level cognitive structures in humans. And to a lesser degree, this also holds for PAI:
Amongst the battery of eligible psychometric tests there also are items which assess not
only high-level capacities, but which move down in the cognitive hierarchy.
Still, PAI indeed has at least one advantage over the Turing Test, the TTT, and most
(if not all) other versions and variants thereof: Contrary to them, due to its reliance
exclusively on quantitative psychometrics tests, PAI offers a well-defined goal and the
option of quantifying progress towards meeting it, getting rid of the seemingly un-
avoidable vagueness and ambiguity in the evaluation of a system’s performance. From
a purely engineering-oriented perspective, this argument should not be dismissed too
easily — it should just always be kept in mind at which price this clarity is obtained.
Going back to the original undertaking of this note, trying to address the question
whether PAI can serve as a guiding force for HAI, tying it even closer to standard
scientific procedures, the answer as so often is not a simple “Yes.” or “No.”, but rather a
“Up to a certain point.”. On the one hand, it surely will have to be the case that an actual
HAI system eventually must be able to perform well on psychometric tests, so using a
wide variety of the latter as means of quantitatively assessing progress in HAI has to
be seen as beneficial. On the other hand, it cannot be presumed that excelling on all
available validated psychometrical measures at any point in time will guarantee that an
artificial system has reached human-level intelligence. In summary, PAI unfortunately
still will not serve as a final methodological answer deciding the question for human-
level intelligence in artificial systems and, thus, falls fundamentally short of its own
promises.
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